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Abstract
This paper studies environmental management policy when two
fossil-fuel-consuming countries non-cooperatively regulate greenhouse-
gas emissions through emission taxes or quotas. The presence of carbon
leakage caused by fuel-price changes a⁄ects the tax-quota equivalence.
We explore each country￿ s incentive to choose an environment regula-
tion instrument within a framework of a two-stage policy choice game
and ￿nd subgame-perfect Nash equilibria. This sheds a new light on the
question of why adopted policy instruments could be di⁄erent among
countries. We also analyze the welfare e⁄ect of creating an interna-
tional market for emission permits. International trade in emission
permits may not bene￿t the fuel-consuming countries.
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11 Introduction
Governments around the world are gradually adopting measures to tackle the
issue of global warming. A major element of these measures in many coun-
tries is the introduction of emission taxes and quotas (including the creation
of markets to trade emission permits). Previous studies on environmental
regulation suggest that, within a closed economy, emission taxes and quo-
tas are essentially equivalent instruments. In an open-economy framework,
however, this is usually not the case.1 In particular, carbon leakage across
countries could arise and a⁄ect the equivalence.
There are three main channels through which international carbon leak-
age can arise. The ￿rst channel is changes in a country￿ s industrial struc-
ture as discussed in Copeland and Taylor (2005) and Ishikawa et al. (2011).
When a country adopts emission regulations, the comparative advantage of
the emission-intensive industry could shift abroad. The second channel is
the relocation of plants in response to emission regulations, particularly in
emission-intensive industries (see Markusen et al., 1993; Markusen et al.,
1995; Ulph and Valentini, 2001; and Ishikawa and Okubo, 2008, for exam-
ple). The third channel, ￿nally, is changes in the price of fossil fuels, as
shown in Ishikawa and Kiyono (2000). A decrease in fossil fuel demand
caused by emission regulations in one country lowers the global price of
fossil fuels, boosting fossil fuel demand and hence greenhouse-gas (GHG)
emissions in other countries.
An important point is that the emission regulations adopted by one coun-
try do not a⁄ect GHG emissions of other countries if these countries employ
emission quotas which are binding. That is, carbon leakage does not occur
once other countries directly control their GHG emissions. Thus, the tough-
ness of each country￿ s anti-global warming policies is a⁄ected by the policy
choices of other countries, in turn a⁄ecting global environmental quality. In
other words, emission taxes and quotas are unilaterally equivalent for each
country given the policy decisions of other countries (unilateral equivalence).
However, they are not unilaterally equivalent once each country understands
1In this study, the term ￿tax-quota equivalence￿is understood to mean that subject
to the objective of national welfare maximization, the government can achieve the same
resource allocation through either an emission tax or an emission quota. However, the
term has several di⁄erent meanings in the previous literature. For example, when the
replacement of an emission tax with a quota that is set to equal emission levels under
the tax-ridden equilibrium gives rise to the same resource allocation across the economy.
Within a partial equilibrium framework in the absence of uncertainty and incomplete
information, such equivalence holds in a perfectly competitive market (see Xepapadeas,
1997) as well as in an imperfectly competitive market without strategic abatement in-
vestment by ￿rms before the government policy decision (see Ulph, 1996). However, the
equivalence breaks down in a general equilibrium model, as shown in Ishikawa and Kiyono
(2006) and Ishikawa and Okubo (2008). This is mainly because an emission quota puts a
cap on a country￿ s total greenhouse gas emissions whereas the emissions are endogenously
determined under emission tax policy.
1that the policy instrument choices of other countries may be a⁄ected by its
own choice under strategic interdependence among countries subject to the
carbon-leakage e⁄ect (strategic non-equivalence).2 3
In this paper, we ￿rst demonstrate unilateral equivalence and strategic
non-equivalence more rigorously. When the equivalence does not hold, an
interesting research question is why some countries adopt emission taxes
while some others adopt emission quotas.4 We then address this question.
We speci￿cally consider Nash equilibrium when countries non-cooperatively
choose their own policy instrument. Our analysis is also instructive to ex-
amine the welfare e⁄ects when creating an international market to trade
emission permits. Therefore, we explore the conditions under which the
creation of international markets to trade emission permits makes all the
participants better o⁄.
When constructing our theoretical model, we incorporate a few spe-
ci￿c features, which are not satisfactorily taken into account in the existing
theoretical literature. First, we focus on international carbon leakage caused
by changes in the fuel price. To our knowledge, there is no theoretical work
(except for another paper of ours, Kiyono and Ishikawa, 2003) that explic-
itly deals with international carbon leakage through fuel price changes.5
Another speci￿c feature is that power generation and heat supply is the ma-
jor source of GHG emissions. According to the International Energy Agency
(IEA), the shares of world CO2 emissions from fuel combustion for electric-
ity and heat, transport, and industry are, respectively, 41%, 23%, and 20%
in 2007.6 In particular, 26% of world total CO2 emissions is generated by
thermal power generation using coal. Since energy such as electricity is not
traded much, the GHG-emission share of the non-tradable is fairly high.
Thus, we introduce the non-tradable sector as the source of GHG emissions
into our theoretical model.
2The issue of unilateral equivalence and strategic non-equivalence has been discussed
rigorously in Kiyono (1985).
3Even in the absence of carbon leakage, the tax-quota equivalence may break down in
a general equilibrium framework when pollution intensities di⁄er across industries. See
Ishikawa and Kiyono (2000,2006).
4Emission trading is implemented by EU and New Zealand. Australia and Canada are
going to introduce emission trading. Finland was the ￿rst country to introduce emission
taxes in 1990. Now a number of European countries employ emission taxes. South Africa
introduced a carbon tax in 2010. Countries such as China are planning to adopt emission
taxes.
5CGE analyses such as Felder and Rutherford (1993), Burniaux and Martins (2000),
and B￿ringer et al. (2010) identify international carbon leakage through fuel price changes.
Felder and Rutherford (1993) and B￿ringer et al. (2010) argue that the changes in fuel
price dominate in the source of international carbon leakage.
6Similarly, according to the Department of Energy and Climate Change in the UK,
39% of CO2 were from the energy supply sector, 24% from road transport, 16% from
business and 16% from residential fossil fuel use in 2009. CO2 accounted for about 84%
of the UK￿ s man-made GHG emissions in 2009.
2We build a model with one fuel-producing (or fuel-exporting) country
and two fuel-consuming (or fuel-importing) countries. In the fuel-consuming
countries, the non-tradable sector emits GHG and causes global warming.
We consider a two-stage policy game in which both fuel-consuming countries
independently choose their emission regulation instrument, either emission
taxes or emission quotas, and then, in the second stage, after observing which
emission regulation instrument the other country has chosen, determine the
speci￿c level of the policy instrument chosen in the ￿rst stage.
Depending on the instrument choices, di⁄erent policy game equilibria
emerge. When both countries choose emission taxes (emission quotas), the
second-stage subgame is the tax-tax policy game (the quota-quota policy
game). When one country chooses emission taxes and the other emission
quotas, the resulting second-stage game is the tax-quota policy game. We
examine which combination of instruments emerges as a subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium for our full game. This analysis sheds a new light on
the question of why adopted policy instruments could be di⁄erent among
countries.
In Kiyono and Ishikawa (2003), we discussed the issue of unilateral equiv-
alence and strategic non-equivalence with carbon leakage through fuel price
changes. However, the analysis there was conducted in a much simpler
framework using partial equilibrium analysis. In addition to providing a
general equilibrium analysis, the present study analyzes the game of choice
of policy instrument. It is also shown that the creation of an international
market for the trade in emission permits may not bene￿t fuel-consuming
countries.
There are many papers that compare various environmental policies in-
cluding emission taxes and quotas.7 Some of them argue what policy instru-
ments should be used. To our knowledge, however, no study has examined
the endogenous environmental-policy choices as a result of a policy game
between countries. We explore the subgame perfect equilibrium when the
countries commit to either taxes or quotas before determining speci￿c in-
strument levels.
Copeland and Taylor (2005) develop a general equilibrium model of in-
ternational trade and examine the welfare e⁄ects of emission trading. They
consider a Heckscher-Ohlin model with three countries (i.e., two North coun-
tries: West and East, and South) and assume that West and East are con-
strained by the emission treaty, but South is not. It is shown that emission
trading between West and East may make them worse o⁄and may not cause
carbon leakage in South although South is free from emission control.8
7See Ulph (1996), Ishikawa and Kiyono (2006), Lahiri and Ono (2007), and Ishikawa
and Okubo (2008), among others.
8As is well known, in the Heckscher-Ohlin model, the factor prices are equalized in
free trade equilibrium when countries are incompletely specialized. This property holds
in Copeland and Taylor (2005) so that the prices of emission permits are equalized in free
3Our analysis di⁄ers from theirs not only in the structure of the model
employed but also in that they explore the welfare e⁄ect led by a marginal
involvement in permit trade (i.e. a limited, small volume of permit trade),
whereas we discuss the total gains and losses from the country￿ s full involve-
ment in permit trade. In Copeland and Taylor (2005), the change in the
terms of trade (TOT) for commodities plays an important role in governing
the welfare e⁄ects. In our analysis, however, when the carbon-leakage e⁄ect
is strong enough, the direction of the change in the TOT for fuel, which is
our counterpart to their TOT for commodities, may not predict whether a
country gains or loses by engaging in permit trade.
Another study that discusses the welfare e⁄ects of international trade in
emission permits on each country is that by Ishikawa et al. (2011). They
use a two-country (North-South) model having both the Heckscher-Ohlin
and Ricardian features. Asymmetric technologies result in a di⁄erence in
the permit prices between North and South under free trade equilibrium.
It is shown that carbon leakage may arise and that emission trading may
not bene￿t both countries. Although the results are somewhat similar to
ours, their deriving force is di⁄erent from ours because trade in fossil fuel
is not considered. Moreover, in their model, carbon leakage is caused when
only one country introduces an emission quota, but in our model, in contrast,
even if both countries employ environmental measures, carbon leakage could
arise between them. This is because one or both countries may implement
emission taxes.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we construct a
model of two fuel-consuming countries emitting GHG and one fuel-producing
country, and show that the relative di⁄erence in the emission coe¢ cient,
that is the GHG emission per unit of fossil fuel, between the fuel-consuming
countries determines the size of the carbon-leakage e⁄ect. In Section 3,
we discuss the properties of the equilibria when the two fuel-consuming
countries choose emission taxes. We also discuss the unilateral equivalence
between emission taxes and quotas, while in Section 4, we show the strategic
non-equivalence between emission taxes and quotas. In Section 5, we explore
each country￿ s incentive to choose an environment regulation instrument
within a framework of a two-stage policy choice game and ￿nd subgame-
perfect Nash equilibria. The results and tools for the analysis in Section 5
are further applied in Section 6 to consider the welfare e⁄ects of creating an
international market for the trade in emission permits. Section 7 concludes.
trade equilibrium with incomplete specialization. Obviously, in such an equilibrium, there
is no incentive for trade in emission permits. To consider permit trade between countries,
they assume that West is completely specialized in the clean good, while East produces
both clean and dirty goods. As a result, permits are exported from East to West.
42 Model
Consider a world consisting of three countries, with countries 1 and 2 both
consuming the fossil fuel supplied by the third country, s. The economy
of each country is characterized by perfect competition. Each of the fuel-
consuming countries produces two goods: a homogeneous tradable commod-
ity (other than the fossil fuel) produced only by labor, and a non-tradable
(say, electricity) produced by labor, fossil fuel, and environment resources.
Production of each good is subject to constant returns to scale, and the
non-tradable sector requires the use of a certain combination of fossil fuel
and the environment. The use of fossil fuel results in GHG emissions, which
degrade global environmental quality.
In this paper, the volume of the GHG emissions is represented by the
environment as an input factor. Thus, the tradable good is what we may
call a ￿clean￿good and the non-tradable good a ￿dirty￿one. We refer to
either of the fuel-consuming countries by superscripts i;j;k 2 f1;2g where
i and j(6= i) represent the di⁄erent countries and k represents either one.
The third country, s, a single country supplying the fossil fuel, produces the
fossil fuel and the homogeneous tradable commodity.9
Thus, each of the fuel-consuming countries produces and exports the
tradable commodity to the fuel-supplying country and imports fossil fuel
to produce the non-tradable good. The government of neither of the three
countries directly intervenes in the trade in the commodity or the fossil
fuel. Hereafter, we use the non-fuel tradable good as the numeraire. The
constant-returns-to-scale production technology used to produce it means
that we can choose the units of output and input so that one unit of the
tradable needs one unit of labor. This means that the wage rate should be
equal to unity across the world.
As our benchmark, we construct a model in which both fuel-consuming
countries regulate their GHG emissions by means of emission taxes.
2.1 Fuel-Consuming Country
Supply-side We start with the supply side. In a fossil-fuel-consuming
country, production of the dirty non-tradable good emits GHG and wors-
ens the quality of the global environment hurting the welfare of households
across the world. According to Meade (1952), the emitted GHG is an ￿un-
paid factor of production￿ , pricing of which is made by the government in
the country having the dirty industry. The speci￿c emission tax rate on
GHG serves as the factor price of the environmental resource for ￿rms in
9We assume for simplicity that country s￿ s output of the non-tradable good is tiny
relative to that of countries 1 and 2 and hence the demand for fossil fuel and GHG
emissions in country s can be ignored.
5the dirty non-tradable sector.10
Next, let r denote the world price of the fossil fuel, ti, the emission
tax rate set by the government in fuel-consuming country i 2 f1;2g, and
ci(r;ti) the unit cost function for the dirty non-tradable sector in country
i 2 f1;2g.11 The assumption of perfect competition subject to constant
returns to scale means that the equilibrium holds only when the price of the
non-tradable denoted by pi is equal to the unit cost, i.e.,
pi = ci(r;ti)
Hereafter, we assume that the unit cost function ci(r;ti) satis￿es all the
standard assumptions except perfect compelentarity between the fuel and





for 8(r;ti), where ci
t(r;ti)
def = @ci(r;ti)=@ti and ci
r(r;ti)
def = @ci(r;ti)=@r. We
call this ei the emission coe¢ cient of country i 2 f1;2g.
One should also note that, by virtue of Shephard￿ s lemma, ci
r(r;ti) gives
the input of fossil fuel required per unit of the non-tradable good and ci
t(r;ri)
is the counterpart for the GHG emissions in the dirty non-tradable sector.




where use was made of the strict concavity of the unit cost function with
respect to the fuel price.
Next, let xi represent the output of the non-tradable. Then, we may
express the fossil fuel demand denoted by fi and the GHG emissions denoted





Demand-side Let us now consider the demand side. The utility of a





i denotes the consumption of the non-tradable, yc
i the consumption
of the tradable, zW
def =
P
k zk world total GHG emissions, D(zW) the world
damage from global warming in terms of the numeraire good, and ￿i(> 0)
10See also Copeland and Taylor (1994).
11The wage rage, being always unity, is suppressed in the unit cost function.
6what extent country i perceives this damage to be a damage to its own
environment. We assume D0(zW) > 0 and D
00
(zW) > 0.
The consumer maximizes the above utility given world total GHG emis-




where mi denotes the national income and pi the domestic price of the non-
tradable good in country i 2 f1;2g. Since there arise no excess pro￿ts in
either sector, the national income is the sum of labor income and emission
tax revenue, i.e.,
mi = Li + tizi;
where Li denotes the labor endowment of country i and use was made of
the wage rate being equal to unity.
Further, assume that the utility function ui(xc
i) satis￿es all the standard








which assures production of the non-tradable good to be always strictly
positive in each country.
Then, one may de￿ne the indirect utility function as follows:












. In the analysis that follows, we also





. Finally, it should be
noted that vi0(pi) = ￿xi(pi) holds by Shephard￿ s lemma.
National welfare To sum up, suppressing the labor endowment term
in the above equation, we employ the following expression for the welfare of
country i.
~ wi(r;ti)








vi0(pi) = ￿xi(pi); (3)













7Di⁄erentiation of (2) yields:
@ ~ wi=@ti = (ti ￿ ￿iD0)zi
t;
@ ~ wi=@r = (ti ￿ ￿iD0)zi
r ￿ (fi + ￿iD0z
j
r);




One should also note the following relations for the succeeding discussion:
fi
r
def = @fi=@r = ci
rrxi + (ci
r)2xi
p < 0; fi
t




def = @zi=@r = eifi
r < 0; zi
t




by virtue of the technological complementarity between fossil fuel and GHG.
As the third and fourth equations of (8) show, each country￿ s GHG emissions
decrease as the fuel price or the emission tax rate increases, which is the
source of carbon leakage considered in our analysis.
2.2 Fuel-Supplying Country
As in the fuel-consuming countries, the wage rate in the fuel-supplying coun-
try is equal to unity. For the purpose of focusing on the e⁄ects of fossil fuel
trade and carbon leakage, we assume that production of fossil fuel is subject
to decreasing returns to scale though the other commodities are subject to
constant returns to scale. By letting ￿(r) represent the maximum pro￿t
function of the fossil-fuel sector, Hotelling￿ s lemma implies that ￿0(r) gives
the supply function of the fossil fuel, which we represent by s(r).
2.3 World Trade Equilibrium
To express the equilibrium, it su¢ ces to write down the world fossil-fuel




fj(r;ti) = 0: (9)
Given the emission tax policies of the fuel-consuming countries t
def =
(t1;t2), the world fuel price is determined via (9), the relation of which we
express by ^ r(t). When either fuel-consuming country raises the emission tax
rate, this dampens its fuel demand, thus leading to a decline in the equilib-
rium fuel price. To show this e⁄ect on the price, we de￿ne the following:
￿r









r=￿r for ‘ 2 f1;2g
s0(r)=￿r for ‘ = s
: (11)
8Here, ￿i represent the relative price sensitivity of fuel-demand by country
i 2 f1;2g and ￿s the relative price sensitivity of fuel-supply by the fuel-





In terms of these relative price sensitivities, one can express the e⁄ect of
an increase in fuel-country i￿ s emission tax rate on the fuel price as follows:
^ ri(t)
def = @^ r=@ti = ￿ei￿i < 0; (12)
where use was made of (8). The following lemma is straightforward from
(12).
Lemma 1 (i) The world fuel price always declines as one of the fuel-consuming
countries raises its emission tax rate. (ii) The decrease in the world fuel
price caused by an increase in a fuel-consuming country￿ s emission tax rate
becomes greater as its emission coe¢ cient and relative price sensitivity of
fuel demand increase.
Note that, with fuel-consuming countries facing an upward-sloping fuel-
supply function s0(r) > 0, the above lemma critically depends on the market
power of each fuel-consuming country. If country i is small with no market
power in the world fuel market, then it cannot a⁄ect the world fuel price.
2.4 Emission Taxes and GHG Emissions
Before investigating each country￿ s strategic incentive for environment regu-
lation, let us look into the e⁄ects of emission tax increases on GHG emissions.
For this purpose, we ￿rst rede￿ne the demand for fuel and GHG emis-
sions as a function of the emission tax rates of the two countries, i.e., the
emission-tax pro￿le t = (t1;t2).
^ fi(t)
def = fi (^ r(t);ti); ^ zi(t)
def = zi (^ r(t);ti): (13)




r^ ri = ￿￿rei(1 ￿ ￿i)￿i < 0
^ fi
j = fi
r^ rj = ￿rej￿i￿j > 0
^ zi
i = ei ^ fi
i = ￿￿re2
i￿i(1 ￿ ￿i) < 0
^ zi
j = ei ^ fi






def = @ ^ fi(t)=@tk and ^ zi
k
def = @^ zi(t)=@tk for i;k = 1;2 and use was
made of (8). The above equations show that an increase in the emission tax
rate by a fuel-consuming country decreases its own fuel demand as well as
9its own GHG emissions, while it increases those of the other fuel-consuming
country (only when there is a decrease in the world fuel price).
An increase in the emission-tax by one country lowers the fuel price,
leading to an increase in the fuel-demand of the other country and hence
an increase in its GHG emissions. This is the basic mechanism of carbon
leakage via trade in fuel considered in this study. This carbon-leakage e⁄ect
involves the possibility of an increase in world total GHG emissions even
with an increase in the emission tax rate of one of the countries.










respectively represent world total GHG emissions and fuel demand as a
function of the tax pro￿le. Using (12) and (14), the e⁄ect of an increase in




def = @ ^ fW(t)=@ti = s0(r)^ ri = ￿s0(r)ei￿i < 0;
^ zW
i
def = @^ zW(t)=@ti = ￿rei￿ifej￿j ￿ ei(1 ￿ ￿i)g;
the latter of which can also be rewritten as:
^ zW









Thus, an increase in the emission tax by either of the two countries
unambiguously reduces the world fuel-demand, but, as (15) shows, it may
increase world total GHG emissions.
Lemma 2 Suppose that country i 2 f1;2g raises its emission tax rate.
Then, world total GHG emissions decrease if and only if ei=ej > ￿j=(1￿￿i).
Hereafter, without loss of generality, we assume that the emission coef-
￿cient is not larger in country 1 than in country 2, i.e., e1 ￿ e2.12 Then,
there are two possible cases when discussing the change in world total GHG
emissions through an increase in either country￿ s emission tax rate. They
are illustrated in Figure 1.
When the relative emission coe¢ cient e1=e2 is in Region N, an increase
in either country￿ s emission tax rate decreases world total GHG emissions.
If it is in Region A, however, then an increase in the emission tax rate by
country 1, provided its emission coe¢ cient is su¢ ciently smaller than that of
country 2, increases world total GHG emissions. This is because such a tax
12e1 < e2 could stem from di⁄erences in arti￿cial and/or natural carbon sinks.
10increase lowers the fuel demand and thus GHG emission by country 1 with
the smaller emission coe¢ cient but the resulting decrease in the fuel price
boosts the fuel demand by country 2 with the larger emission coe¢ cient,
leading to a large increase in GHG emissions.
As already mentioned, the possibility of an increase in world GHG emis-
sions as a result of an increase in the emission tax in a country depends on
the country￿ s market power in the world fuel market. In fact, when the fuel
price is constant, the increase in a country￿ s emission tax rate only a⁄ects its
own GHG emissions, so that in this case world total GHG emissions always
decrease.
The above analysis establishes the following proposition.
Proposition 1 1. When ￿2=(1 ￿ ￿1) < e1=e2 holds and hence the emis-
sion coe¢ cients of the two fuel-consuming countries do not di⁄er to
a great extent, an increase in the emission tax rate by either country
decreases world total GHG emissions.
2. When e1=e1 < ￿2=(1 ￿ ￿1) holds and hence the emission coe¢ cient
di⁄er a lot, an increase in the emission tax rate by country 1 with
the smaller emission coe¢ cient increases, rather than decreases, world
total GHG emissions.
Moreover, the following results hold when both fuel-consuming country
simultaneously raise their emission tax rates.13
Lemma 3 There always holds ^ zW
1 + ^ zW
2 < 0.
Therefore, even when an increase in the emission tax by country 1 with
the smaller emission coe¢ cient increases world total GHG emissions, there
must be a decrease in world total GHG emissions if both countries jointly
raise their emission tax rates by the same in￿nitesimal amount.
Finally, let us consider the welfare implications. To do so,
3 The Individually Optimal Emission Tax
Next, we discuss the properties of the equilibria when the two fuel-consuming
countries non-cooperatively choose optimal emission taxes and/or quotas.
We begin by looking at the case in which each fuel-consuming country sets
its emission tax rate knowing the tax rate set by the other country, which
we call the tax-tax policy equilibrium. Since the optimal tax rate should
maximize each country￿ s national welfare given the other￿ s tax rate, we refer
to it as the individually optimal emission tax rate in the following discussion.
13The proof is provided in Appendix A.
113.1 Determinants of the Optimal Emission Tax
In this subsection, we point out that there are three determinants of the
individually optimal emission tax rate. For this, we obtain the individually
optimal emission tax rate. Inserting the equilibrium fuel-price function into
(2), we can express each country￿ s welfare as the following function of the
tax pro￿le:
^ wiT(t)
def = ~ wi (ti; ^ r(t)): (16)
We assume that the above welfare function is strictly concave in the coun-
try￿ s own emission tax rate.
Since the optimal tax rate is chosen non-cooperatively, it should satisfy
the following ￿rst-order condition for welfare maximization:
0 = @ ^ wiT
@ti = @ ~ wi
@ti + @ ~ wi
@r ^ ri









= (ti ￿ ￿iD0)^ zi




where use was made of (7). Letting tT
i represent the solution of the above
￿rst-order condition for welfare maximization, i.e., country i￿ s emission tax
rate at the non-cooperative tax-tax policy game equilibrium, we have
tT









































where use was made of (12) and (14).
In (18), each term represents di⁄erent determinant of emission tax. The
￿rst term represents the well-known basic motive for internalizing negative
externalities caused by emissions. This term is obviously positive. The
second term is related to the TOT for fuel. As a result of an emission
tax, the fuel-consuming country can improve the TOT for fuel and hence
welfare. This e⁄ect works to raise the emission tax rate. Finally, the last
term arises because of carbon leakage. Since an increase in the emission
tax rate lowers the fuel price, the other fuel-consuming country￿ s demand
for the fossil fuel is boosted, which worsens the global environment quality
through an increase in GHG emissions. This carbon-leakage e⁄ect works
to reduce the emission tax rate. If this carbon-leakage e⁄ect is su¢ ciently
large, then the optimal policy would in fact be to impose a negative, rather
12than a positive, emission tax rate. This case occurs only when an increase
in the emission tax rate increases world total GHG emissions (i.e., ^ zW
i > 0),
as is shown in (19). Since ^ zW
2 < 0 always holds with e1 ￿ e2, the optimal
emission tax could be negative only in country 1.
Therefore, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 2 1. Given the emission tax rate of the other country, the
TOT e⁄ect makes the optimal emission tax rate for a fuel-consuming
country higher but the carbon-leakage e⁄ect makes it lower.
2. Given the emission tax rate of the other country, each fuel-consuming
country sets a strictly positive rate of emission tax if an increase in
its own emission tax rate decreases world total GHG emissions. A
negative emission tax rate is optimal only in country 1. This is the
case only if an increase in country 1￿ s emission tax rate increases world
total GHG emissions.
Note that the carbon-leakage e⁄ect vanishes when a fuel-consuming coun-
try is a price-taker in the world fuel market, so that its optimal emission tax









The emission tax rate should be set equal to the perceived marginal environ-
ment damage. This result is the same with the standard result obtained in a
closed-economy model where neither the TOT e⁄ect nor the carbon-leakage
e⁄ect exists.
We should mention that the e⁄ect of an increase in the emission co-
e¢ cient on the optimal emission tax rate is ambiguous. It increases the
marginal environment damage, D0. It is straightforward from (21) that an
increase in D0 induces the country to raise the optimal emission tax rate
without carbon leakage. However, this is not necessary the case with car-
bon leakage (see (19)). That is, an increase in the emission coe¢ cient raises
the country￿ s optimal emission tax rate without carbon leakage, but may
not raise country 1￿ s optimal emission tax rate with carbon leakage.
3.2 Shapes of the Reaction Curves
When we solve (17) for the own emission tax rate, the solution gives country
i￿ s reaction function, which we denote by RiT(tj). In this subsection, we
examine its shape.
As has been made clear in the previous literature, when each fuel-
consuming country is a price-taker in the world fuel market, the optimal
emission tax rate formula (21) implies that the optimal emission tax of one
country decreases as that of the other country increases. This is because an
13emission tax increase by the other country decreases the own GHG emis-
sions as well as the world total, which decreases the marginal environment
damage. This leads the ￿rst country to lower its emission tax rate. For this
reason, each country￿ s reaction curve is downward-sloping in the tax-tax
policy game in the absence of the carbon-leakage e⁄ect.
However, as is implied by (18), once the carbon-leakage e⁄ect occurs, the
shape of the reaction function may change and it is possible that it becomes
upward-sloping.
Lemma 4 In the presence of carbon leakage through fuel trade, each coun-
try￿ s emission tax rate is not necessarily a strategic substitute to the other￿ s
tax rate in the tax-tax policy game.
3.3 A Tax Increase by the Other Country
We next consider whether a fuel-consuming country gains or loses if the
other fuel-consuming country raises its emission tax rate. Speci￿cally, we
evaluate this e⁄ect when the country initially employs the optimal-response
emission tax rate.
It is proved in Appendix B that even in the presence of carbon leakage,
one ￿nds that a tax increase by either fuel-consuming country bene￿ts the
other country. That is, @ ^ wiT=@tj > 0 holds.
Proposition 3 Given the individually optimal emission tax rate, the wel-
fare of either of the fuel-consuming countries improves as the other country
increases the emission tax rate.
Thus, as in the standard literature, emission taxation by a fuel-consuming
country gives rise to pecuniary external economies to the other fuel-consuming
country. Using this result, it is straightforward to depict each country￿ s iso-
welfare contour at the non-cooperative equilibrium, as shown in Figure 2.
In the ￿gure, point T1 is the non-cooperative equilibrium. Country i￿ s iso-
welfare contour is given by wT
i . Thus, the two fuel-consuming countries are
better o⁄by raising their tax rates above those at the non-cooperative equi-
librium. Note that this result holds regardless of whether the emission tax
rates are strategic substitutes or complements.
4 The Equivalence between Taxes and Quotas
As a preliminary analysis for the later discussion as to equilibria under emis-
sion quota, we examine in the present section whether equivalence between
emission taxes and quotas holds. By emission quota, we mean a country-
wide cap of total GHG emissions. To exclude any possible distortion other
than replacement of the tax with a quota, we assume that the government
14issues a certain number of GHG emission permits and establishes a perfectly
competitive market for the domestic trade in such permits.
4.1 Unilateral Equivalence
From the viewpoint of an individual country, taxes and quotas, given the
policy instrument of the other country, can be shown to be equivalent in
the sense that they achieve the same world resource allocation. We call this
result unilateral equivalence between emission taxes and quotas.
First, as in the preceding discussion, suppose that country j employs
emission taxes. Then in view of (13), given country i￿ s emission quota qi,
the equilibrium permit price ti should satisfy
qi = ^ zi(ti;tj):
Thus, given country j￿ s emission tax rate, there is a one-to-one relationship
between the emission quota qi and the emission tax rate or permit price ti.
This establishes that emission taxes and quotas are equivalent for country i
given country j￿ s emission tax rate.
Next consider the case in which country j sets the emission quota qj.
Then, given qj, when country i chooses the emission quota qi, the resulting
permit prices, ti and tj, should satisfy
qi = ^ zi(ti;tj);qj = ^ zj(tj;ti):
Since
￿z
def = ^ z1
1^ z2
2 ￿ ^ z1
2^ z2
1 > 0 (22)
holds,14 the implicit function theorem can be applied to ensure a one-to-one
relationship between the permit-price pro￿le t and the emission-quota pro￿le
q
def = (q1;q2). This implies that emission taxes and quotas are equivalent for
country i given country j￿ s emission quota.15
The above discussion leads to the following unilateral equivalence result.
Proposition 4 Given the environmental policy instrument of the other fuel-
consuming country, emission taxes and quotas are equivalent for each indi-
vidual country.
This proposition implies that given the other country￿ s environmental
policy instrument, a country￿ s reaction curves are the same regardless of its
choice between taxes and quotas once they are transformed and depicted
over the tax-tax space.















































15A more rigorous proof is provided in Appendix C.
154.2 Strategic Non-equivalence
Even when emission taxes and quotas are equivalent given the other coun-
try￿ s environmental policy instrument, they are no longer equivalent once
the other country changes its policy instrument. In fact, once the other
country switches from emission taxes to quotas, each country has an incen-
tive to strengthen its own environmental regulation. Let us demonstrate
this result, which we call the strategic non-equivalence result.
We assume that the two countries initially employ emission taxes. In
Figure 2, the equilibrium is given by point T1 where the reaction curves
(which are not shown in the ￿gure to avoid it getting too complex) intersect
with each other. Now suppose that country 2 switches from emission taxes to
quotas. Given the associated tax pro￿le, draw a curve showing the tax pairs
keeping country 2￿ s GHG emissions constant. This iso-GHG-emissions curve
is given by zT
2 . In view of (14), such a curve should be upward-sloping. Then,
since country 1￿ s iso-welfare contours are U-shaped as shown in Figure 2 and
its welfare improves in the higher country 2￿ s emission tax rate, country 1
becomes better o⁄ by choosing point Q1 along the iso-GHG-emissions curve
zT
2 .
The result is that country 1￿ s emission tax rate becomes higher as well as
country 2￿ s. The reason is as follows. Since country 2￿ s GHG emissions are
held constant, its fuel demand is also kept constant under the emission quota.
This implies that country 1￿ s tax increase results in no carbon leakages,
leading to an increase in the emission tax rate.
How do the GHG emissions by country 1 change after such a change
in the emission tax policy? The ￿gure also shows the iso-GHG-emissions
curves for country 1, zT
1 and z
Q
1 . They are also upward-sloping and their





































where use was made of (22).
Since ^ z1
1 < 0, GHG emissions on the iso-GHG-emissions curve z
Q
1 are
smaller than those on the curve zT
1 . This is consistent with the result for
the case above when country 1 employs more stringent environmental regu-
lations.
Thus, we obtain:
Proposition 5 If a country switches from an emission tax to an individ-
ually equivalent emission quota, then the other country has an incentive to
raise its emission tax rate or to reduce its emission quota level.
As the above proposition implies, one country￿ s reaction curve (which
is not shown in the ￿gure) shifts rightward on the tax-tax plane when the
16other country switches from an emission tax to a quota. One should note
that the resulting new reaction curve does not necessarily have the same
shape as the original curve. That is, even when, for example, the original
reaction curve is downward-sloping given the other country￿ s emission tax
rate, the new curve may become upward-sloping given the other country￿ s
quota. The next subsection demonstrates this result.
4.3 Reaction Curves in the Quota Game
Consider now a policy game in which both fuel-consuming countries employ
emission quotas. We call this the quota-quota policy game. Let qi denote
country i￿ s quota and q
def = (q1;q2) the quota pro￿le. In view of (2)-(6), each
fuel-consuming country￿ s welfare is now described by
e wiQ(ti;r)








vi0(pi) = ￿xi(pi) (3)
pi = ci(r;ti) (4)
fi = fi(r;ti) (5)







where ti now represents the price of the tradable emission permit in country
i. The last equation (25) determines the equilibrium fuel price as a function







We insert this into (24), and solve for ti. We then obtain the price of the
tradable permit as a function of the quota pro￿le, which we express by b ti(q).
From b rQ(q) and b ti(q), the country￿ s welfare is represented as a function of
the quota pro￿le:
b wiQ(q)
def = e wiQ(ti(q);rQ(q)):
In the quota-quota policy game, each country sets the quota so as to
maximize its welfare given by (23), so that the following ￿rst-order condition
holds:









@qi + (ti ￿ ￿iD0)
= ￿
fi
eis0(r) + (ti ￿ ￿iD0)
(26)
17where use was made of (24) and fi = ci
rxi.







which, compared with (18), shows that there are no carbon-leakage e⁄ects.
This means, as is implied by Proposition 5, that each fuel-consuming country
has an incentive to strengthen its environmental regulation by setting a
higher emission tax rate (or, a higher price for emission permits).
The following proposition is established.
Proposition 6 If both fuel-consuming countries employ emission quotas,
then there are no carbon-leakage e⁄ects, and hence each country has an
incentive to strengthen its environmental regulation compared with the case
of emission taxes.
In general, however, the shape of the associated reaction curve is am-
biguous. In the absence of fuel trade, (27) is rewritten as t
Q
i = ￿iD0. Since
the domestic permit price is independent of the other country￿ s quota, it
is straightforward to see that each country￿ s emission quota is a strategic
substitute to the other￿ s. In the presence of fuel trade, however, this is not
necessarily the case.
Let us now examine the relationship between the original reaction func-
tions in terms of emission quota levels and the corresponding reaction curve
in terms of emission tax rates. Let ￿i(qj)
def = argmaxqi b wiQ(q). Since
qk = ^ zk(t) holds for k 2 f1;2g, the reaction function in terms of emission
tax rates, ti = RiQ(tj), should satisfy


















































Since ej￿j=ei(1￿￿i) < ej(1￿￿j)=ei￿i always holds, it is straightforward to






















As the above lemma shows, under the quota-quota policy game, the
reaction curve in terms of emission tax rates becomes upward-sloping even
when the corresponding reaction curve in terms of emission quota levels
is downward-sloping. Moreover, when the original reaction curve in the
quota-quota policy game over the quota-quota space is upward-sloping, the
corresponding transformed reaction curve should always be upward-sloping.
4.4 A Quota Decrease by the Other Country
What if the other country reduces its emission quota level in the quota-quota
policy game? The following shows that if a country optimizes its emission
quota in response to the quota set by the other country, such a decrease in











(by virtue of the envelope theorem)
= ￿￿iD0 ￿ fib r
Q
j < 0: (29)
Thus, in the quota-quota policy game, each country￿ s choice of the emis-
sion quota level generates external diseconomies for the other country. This
means that the incentive for each country to reduce GHG emissions through
quotas is not enough from the viewpoint of the joint welfare of both fuel-
consuming countries. Thus, we have established:
Proposition 7 If both fuel-consuming countries further reduce their GHG
emissions through quotas, then both can be better o⁄ than at the non-cooperative
quota-quota policy game equilibrium.
5 Strategic Interdependence
5.1 Policy Instrument Choices and Subgame Equilibria
The result of the strategic non-equivalence of emission taxes and quotas
implies that the quality of the global environment will di⁄er depending on
each country￿ s choice of policy instrument. These di⁄erences are shown in
Figures 3 (a) and (b). Figure 3(a) shows the case in which the reaction
curves of both fuel-consuming countries are downward-sloping, while Figure
3 (b) shows the case in which they are upward-sloping.
19In the ￿gures, each intersection of the reaction curves of the two coun-
tries represent a non-cooperative environmental policy equilibrium for each
possible combination of instrument choices. Thus, for example, point ETQ
shows the equilibrium when country 1 chooses emission taxes and country
2 emission quotas.
5.2 Welfare Comparison
As already discussed in Section 4.3, in the quota-quota policy game, both
countries tend to strengthen their environmental regulation compared with
the tax-tax policy game. Moreover, in view of Proposition 3, one may be
tempted to conclude that both countries would be better o⁄ at the quota-
quota policy game equilibrium EQQ than at the tax-tax policy game equi-
librium ETT. In general, however, this is not correct. The reason is that
EQQ does not always lie within the set of the tax pro￿les dominating ETT
for both countries.
For a more speci￿c welfare comparison among the possible equilibria, let
us compare EQQ with the equilibrium in which country i chooses emission
taxes but country j chooses emission quotas. Movement from the latter to
the former requires changes in the tax pro￿le along country i￿ s transformed
reaction curve RiQ(tj) (see Figures 3 (a) and (b)). This is because when
country i switches to emission quotas, country j has an incentive to alter
its emission quota so as to raise the price of domestic emission permits, or,
e⁄ectively, the emission tax rate.































































where use was made of the envelope theorem, (29), (28) and (14). Thus,
country i is better o⁄ by switching to emission quotas given country j￿ s
choice of emission quotas if and only if country j￿ s GHG emissions decrease
with an increase in its emission tax rate along country i￿ s transformed reac-
tion curve, or alternatively if and only if dRiQ(tj)=dtj < ej(1 ￿ ￿j)=ei￿i.
Let ETiQj denote the equilibrium in which country i chooses emission
taxes and country j emission quotas, and ETiQj ￿i EQQ means that country
i￿ s welfare is strictly higher at ETiQj than at EQQ. Then the above discussion
can be summed up in the following proposition.












These results, based on Proposition 3 (i.e., EQiTj ￿i ETT), are summa-
rized in Figure 4. Noting ei(1 ￿ ￿i)=ej￿j > ei￿i=ej(1 ￿ ￿j), we have four
regions in the ￿gure. We can easily con￿rm in the ￿gure that the quota-
quota policy game equilibrium EQQ may not be the best for both countries.
We are now ready to determine which combination of the environment
regulation instruments emerges as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for
our full game. Noting Figure 4, we can draw Figure 5 that illustrates possible
equilibria when both countries simultaneously choose a policy instrument.
In Region QQ, a quota policy is the dominant strategy for both countries, so
that EQQ arises.16 In Region QT (TQ), the choice of a quota policy domi-
nates that of a tax policy for country 1 (2) but country 2 (1) prefers emission
taxes when country 1 (2) chooses quotas, so that EQT (ETQ) arises. Lastly,
in Region U, each country is better o⁄ by choosing a policy instrument dif-
ferent from the other￿ s choice, so that there are at least three equilibria; two
are pure-strategy equilibria, ETQ and EQT, and the last is a mixed-strategy
equilibrium.17
Thus, we obtain:
Proposition 9 Both countries choose emission quotas if both dR1Q(t2)=dt2 <
e2(1 ￿ ￿2)=e1￿1 and dR2Q(t1)=dt1 < e1(1 ￿ ￿1)=e2￿2 hold. Countries 1
and 2, respectively, choose an emission tax and an emission quota if both
dR1Q(t2)=dt2 > e2(1 ￿ ￿2)=e1￿1 and dR2Q(t1)=dt1 < e1(1 ￿ ￿1)=e2￿2 hold,
and vice versa if both dR1Q(t2)=dt2 < e2(1 ￿ ￿2)=e1￿1 and dR2Q(t1)=dt1 >
e1(1 ￿ ￿1)=e2￿2 hold.
This proposition suggests a reason why employed policy instruments are
di⁄erent across countries.
6 The Welfare Implications of Creating an Inter-
national Market for Emission Permits
In this section, on the basis of the analysis above, we explore the welfare
e⁄ects of creating an international market for emission permit market. To
16When e1￿1=e2(1￿￿2) < dR
2Q=dt1 < e1(1￿￿1)=e2￿2 and dR
1Q=dt2 < e2(1￿￿2)=e1￿1,
EQT ￿1 EQQ holds. Since country 2 chooses quotas in that region, however, EQT is not
realized. Similarly, ETQ is not realized when e2￿2=e1(1￿￿1) < dR
1Q=dt2 < e2(1￿￿2)=e1￿1
and dR
2Q=dt1 < e1(1 ￿ ￿1)=e1￿1.
17A mixed-strategy equilibrium is easily obtained. See Appendix D.
21exclude any possible problems in choosing the world total volume of tradable
permits, we assume that its volume is set equal to the GHG emissions chosen
at a non-cooperative environmental regulation equilibrium before the market
creation. More speci￿cally, we assume that the amount of tradable emission
permits each country is endowed with is the same as the country would
choose before the creation of an international permit market.
Let qe
i denote the size of country i￿ s GHG emissions at an equilibrium
and te
i its associated emission tax rate or permit price. Since each country
is endowed with qe
i units of emission permit, world total GHG emissions are




k. Free permit trade leads to equalization of the
permit price between the two countries.
Noting Lemma 2 and Proposition 1, we examine two possible cases. The
￿rst is Case N of ^ zW
1 < 0 and ^ zW
2 < 0 (i.e., when e1=e2 lies in Region
N in Figure 1). The iso-GHG-emissions curve for this case is shown in
Figure 6(a). Along the curve, when t1 rises, t2 must fall. Otherwise, world
total GHG emissions would increase. Thus, the iso-GHG-emissions curve is
downward-sloping.18 The second is Case A of ^ zW
1 > 0 and ^ zW
2 < 0 (i.e.,
when e1=e2 lies in Region A in Figure 1). The iso-GHG-emissions curve is
upward-sloping, as shown in Figure 6(b). Note that in the second case, the
iso-GHG-emissions curve has a slope of less than unity by virtue of Lemma
3.
The critical di⁄erence between the two cases is as follows. In the ￿rst
case, the equilibrium permit price under international trade in emission per-
mits, denoted by tm, lies between the initial permit prices of both countries.
In the second case, however, tm is either greater or less than the initial
domestic prices. If the starting tax-pro￿le is located above (below) the
equal-tax-rate line (i.e., the 45￿ line) as shown in Figure 6 (b), tm is greater
(less) than the initial domestic prices.
We now examine the welfare e⁄ects of allowing international trade in
emission permits. For this purpose, we consider the relationship between
the domestic permit prices in the two countries. This can be obtained by




^ zi(t1;t2) = 0: (30)
Country 2￿ s permit price is then determined as a function of country 1￿ s








where one should note that the assumption of e1 ￿ e2 assures ^ zW
2 < 0 but
^ zW





2; t2m(tm) = tm:
The associated equilibrium fuel price, denoted by r = rm(t1), satis￿es:
s(r) ￿ f1(r;t1) ￿ f2 (r;t2m(t1)) = 0:






(e2 ￿ e1) ￿ 0; (32)
where use was made of e1 ￿ e2. This implies that an increase in t1 as a
result of country 1￿ s exports of emission permits decreases the equilibrium
fuel price if e1 < e2 holds. The intuition is as follows. If country 1 exports
emission permits to country 2, then emissions decrease in country 1 but
increase in country 2. Since world total GHG emissions are kept constant,
the world demand for fuel decreases with e1 < e2 and hence the fuel price
falls.
The welfare of country i is given by:
wiM(t1)









pi = ci (rm(ti);ti);
ti =
￿
t1 for i = 1
t2m(t1) for i = 2
:
Thus, noting that world total GHG emissions are constant, we have the
following expressions for the change in each country￿ s welfare resulting from












The ￿rst term corresponds to the standard gains from trade in emission
permits. There are gains from trade for the permit-exporting (the permit-
importing) country if the permit price rises (falls) as a result of permit
trade. The second term stems from the change in the TOT for fuel. If
country 1 exports emission permits to country 2, then the world demand for











1 > z1 and qe
2 < z2 hold for 8t1 > te
1. By virtue of r0
m ￿ 0 and (31), the
right-hand side of (34) is strictly positive for 8t1 > te
1, while the right-hand
side of (35) is strictly positive for 8t1 > te
1 if ^ zW
1 ￿ 0, which holds when
carbon leakage is not very strong. Thus, if the autarky emission permit
price is lower in country 1, where the emission coe¢ cient is smaller, and
carbon leakage is weak, then both countries become better o⁄ by creating
an international market for emission permits. As mentioned above, there are
two sources for the gains from permit trade here. The ￿rst is the standard
gains from trade, while the second is the gains from the improvement in the
TOT for fossil fuel.
In Figure 6(a), both countries gain if the permit prices without interna-
tional trade in permits satisfy te
1 < te
2 (say, N2). However, the welfare e⁄ect
of creating a world market for permit trade is ambiguous for both countries
if te
1 > te
2 (say, N1). This is because emission trading worsens the TOT for
fossil fuel. In Figure 6 (b), if te
1 < te
2 (say, point A2), then country 1 gains
but country 2 may or may not gain. If te
1 > te
2 (say, point A1), on the other
hand, then country 2 loses but country 1 may or may not lose.
The following should be noted in the case of Figure 6 (b). First, only
country 1 can realize the standard gains from trade. At point A1 (A2),
country 2 exports (imports) the emission permits, but the permit price falls
(rises) in country 2. Second, the e⁄ect of emission trading on country 2￿ s
welfare is ambiguous at point A2, though the total welfare of the two fuel-
consuming countries increases. Given e1 ￿ e2 and t1 > te
1, the change in the
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￿ (f1 + f2)r0
m(t1) > 0;
where use was made of ^ zW
1 + ^ zW
2 < 0.
Therefore, we have obtained the following proposition.
Proposition 10 Given e1 ￿ e2, when te
1 < tm, the creation of a world
market for permit trade unambiguously makes country 1 better o⁄ and makes
country 2 better o⁄ if ^ zW
1 ￿ 0.
Thus, mutually welfare-enhancing permit trade necessarily arises if the
autarky emission permit price is lower in country 1 with the smaller emission
coe¢ cient and carbon leakage is not be very strong. However, one should
note that, unlike Copeland and Taylor (2005), improvement in the TOT here
24does not always assure that both countries become better o⁄. In Figure 6
(b), a shift from point A2 to M entails the TOT improvement for both fuel-
consuming countries, but country 2 may lose from international emission
trading.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we explored environmental policy choices in the presence of
international carbon leakage caused by fuel price changes, explicitly taking
into account international trade in fossil fuel. We considered a world con-
sisting of two fuel-consuming countries emitting GHG and a fuel-producing
country. The fuel-consuming countries non-cooperatively regulate GHG
emissions through emission taxes or quotas. The two policy instruments
are equivalent for each country if the other country￿ s choice of policy in-
strument is given. However, the presence of the carbon-leakage e⁄ect af-
fects each country￿ s policy stance on global warming once the other country
switches its policy instrument. That is, non-equivalence between emission
taxes and quotas could arise. Such strategic non-equivalence a⁄ects the
subgame perfect equilibrium when the countries commit to either emission
taxes or quotas before determining their speci￿c level. The results of, and
tools for, the analysis were then applied to discuss the welfare e⁄ects of cre-
ating an international market for the trade in emission permits. We found
that the creation of such a market improves the welfare of each participant
when (i) there is an increase in the emission permit price for the country
with the smaller emission coe¢ cient (i.e., the more e¢ cient environmental
technology) and (ii) the di⁄erence in the level of environmental technology
is not large between the two participants.
As was shown, the presence of carbon leakage and its size critically a⁄ect
the optimal environmental policy of each country. As an illustration of
the implications of the results obtained here, we may regard country 1 as
the North (advanced countries with better environmental technologies) and
country 2 as the South. Doing so, the following two policy implications can
be derived.
First, when only the North tightens environmental regulations, there is a
danger that world total GHG emissions may increase, rather than decrease,
thus aggravating global warming. In this sense, what would be required
is to call on the South to cooperate with the North in dealing with global
warming. Second, when initially the North is tougher against global warm-
ing, the creation of an international market to trade emission permits may
not bene￿t both North and South. This is likely to be the case when car-
bon leakage is strong. A necessary condition for both North and South to
gain from international emission trading is that their emission coe¢ cients
are not di⁄erent too much. Thus, technology transfers from North to South
25may play an important role when creating an international market to trade
emission permits.
The purpose of this paper was to present a simple, stylized model in
order to focus on the international carbon leakage caused by changes in the
fuel price. To do so, we assumed that the production of the non-tradable
good alone is responsible for GHG emissions and that the fuel-producing
country does not emit GHG. However, it would be worthwhile to examine
the implications of this approach in more generalized models.
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A. Proof of ^ zW
1 + ^ zW
2 < 0
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￿
= 2e1e2￿1￿2 ￿ e2
1￿1(1 ￿ ￿1) ￿ e2
2￿2(1 ￿ ￿2):
Consider the right-hand side as a quadratic equation in e1. Then, the asso-




2 ￿ ￿1￿2(1 ￿ ￿1)(1 ￿ ￿2)e2
2 = e2
2￿1￿2(￿1 + ￿2 ￿ 1) < 0;
which implies that the given equation never becomes non-negative given
e1e2 6= 0. This establishes
^ zW
1 + ^ zW
2 < 0:
B. Proof of @ ^ wiT=@tj > 0
In this appendix, we prove Proposition 3. By construction of the welfare
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C. Proof of Unilateral Equivalence
To prove the unilateral equivalence between emission taxes and quotas, we
must show that there is a one-to-one relationship for each fuel-consuming
country between the emission tax rate and the emission quota given the
other. Let us prove this ￿rst for the case in which the other country chooses
emission taxes.
Given country j￿ s emission tax rate tj, let qi denote the emission quota
or GHG emissions by country i. The equilibrium condition requires:




Solving the second equation for the fuel price and denoting the solution by









Insert this relation into the ￿rst equation and solve the latter for the equi-
librium emission tax rate or emission permit price ti. Let tiT(qi;tj) express










by virtue of (8). This establishes the result.
Next, consider the case in which the other country chooses emission quo-
tas. Let qj denote country j￿ s emission quota. Then again the equilibrium
requires:





The equilibrium fuel price depends on the quota pro￿le q. We express this







Insert this into the ￿rst equation. Then the emission tax rate is determined











which establishes the result.
29D. Mixed-strategy Equilibrium
A mixed-strategy equilibrium in Section 5 is easily obtained. Let ￿T
j denote
the probability that country j chooses emission taxes. Then country i is
indi⁄erent between taxes and quotas if and only if
￿T
j wi








TiQj for example represents country i￿ s equilibrium welfare when
country i chooses emission taxes and country j emission quotas. The above
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Figure 2: Jointly better tax profiles for the fuel-consuming countries
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Figure 5: Possible equilibria




Figure 6 (b): International trade in permits: Case A
O
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